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law.”1  Justice Foster of the New Hampshire Supreme Court spoke 
these words of disfavor about punitive damages in 1873.  In contrast, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1914 believed that: 
The law giving exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the English 
love of liberty regulated by law.  It tends to elevate the jury as a 
responsible instrument of government, discourages private reprisals, 
restrains the strong, influential, and unscrupulous, vindicates the 
right of the weak, and encourages recourse to, and confidence in, 
the courts of law by those wronged or oppressed by acts or practices 
not cognizable in, or not sufficiently punished, by the criminal law.2 
These words of disfavor and approval are indicative of the 
controversial nature of the punitive damages doctrine that has 
persisted since the doctrine’s earliest development in the United 
States.3 
Oregon has often been involved in punitive damages controversies, 
with three of its punitive damages cases reaching the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  In 1994, for example, in the case of Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. 
Oberg, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Oregon’s denial of judicial 
review of the size of punitive damages awards violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.4  Then, in 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Cooper 
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. that a court of appeals 
must review a Due Process Clause challenge to a punitive damages 
award under the de novo standard of review rather than the abuse of 
discretion standard.5  Finally, in 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court 
 
1 2 JOHN J. KIRCHNER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 2:01 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (1872)); see also 
id. (discussing the arguments that have been advanced either favoring or opposing the 
retention of punitive damages as a doctrine of the civil law); see also DAN B. DOBBS, LAW 
OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION § 3.11(1) (2d. ed. 1993).  There has also 
been, however, debate over whether punitive damage awards have in fact increased in size 
and number in recent decades.  Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in 
Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1990).  Judge Posner and Judge Landes, for 
instance, have reported a sample of products liability cases that indicate punitive damages 
were approved in only about five percent of cases, that those amounts were moderate, and 
that the ratios to actual damages were not incongruent.  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 302–07 (1987). 
2 Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 18, 20 (Wis. 1914). 
3 See DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.11(1). 
4 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994). 
5 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001).  In 
that case, the “manufacturer of [a] multifunction hand tool sued its competitor for, inter 
alia, false advertising.”  Id. at 424.  The jury awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages 
and $4.5 million in punitive damages.  Id.  The U.S. District Court for the District of 
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concluded Oregon’s long-contested case of Williams v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc.,6 in which Philip Morris, a tobacco company that opposed 
the amount of punitive damages awarded against it at the trial level, 
was handed “one of its few defeats ever in court.”7 
 
Oregon rejected the competitor’s claim that the punitive damages award was 
unconstitutionally excessive.  Id.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the punitive damage award, concluding that the district court's refusal to reduce 
the award was not an abuse of discretion.  Id.  The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held that 
courts of appeals should apply the de novo standard when reviewing a district court's 
determination of constitutionality of punitive damage award.  Id. 
6 Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 344 Or. 45, 176 P.3d 1255 (2008), cert denied, 129 
S.Ct. 1436 (2009). 
7 Robert S. Peck & James E. Rooks, Jr., National Perspective, DAVID B. ROBINSON, 
http://davidbrobinson.com/Articles/Punitive-damage-awards-survive-appellate-court          
-scrutiny.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).  At the state trial court level, Mayola Williams 
sued Philip Morris, the manufacturer of her husband Jesse Williams’s favorite brand of 
cigarettes, after Mr. Williams died of lung cancer in 1997.  Williams v. Philip Morris Inc., 
182 Or. App. 44, 47, 48 P.3d 824, 828 (2002), aff’d 344 Or. 45, 176 P.3d 1255 (2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1436 (2009).  After a seven-week trial, an Oregon jury awarded 
Mrs. Williams $821,485.80 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive 
damages.  Id.  However, “Philip Morris was able to use its enormous financial resources to 
drag the litigation out for ten more years, including three trips to the United States 
Supreme Court.”  Peck & Rooks, supra.  First, in 2003, after granting certiorari, the U.S. 
Supreme Court “held that punitive damages could not be used to punish and deter conduct 
in states beyond the court’s jurisdiction and suggested that single-digit ratios were most 
likely to satisfy the test for due-process excessiveness.”  Id.  The Court therefore “vacated 
the judgment and sent the case back to Oregon for reconsideration.”  Id.  “On remand, 
however, the Oregon appellate courts reinstated the full punitive damages award, holding 
that extraterritorial impact had not been considered and that the award could be justified” 
because the defendant’s conduct was “reprehensible on a scale not seen before in Oregon.”  
Id.  Subsequently, Philip Morris again “sought certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
held that the Oregon Supreme Court had relied on faulty constitutional reasoning in 
rejecting a proffered jury instruction . . . and sent the case back to Oregon for 
reconsideration.”  Id.  “On the latest remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that it was 
obligated to consider Philip Morris’ state-law objections to the jury instruction, 
believ[ing]” that it had decided the federal constitutional issues correctly.  Id.  The Oregon 
Supreme Court, in “[a]pplying Oregon’s requirement that parties are obliged to proffer 
jury instructions that are clear and correct in all respects, [held] that Philip Morris had 
materially misstated relevant Oregon law and that the trial court had therefore committed 
no error in denying the instruction.”  Id.  Finally, Philip Morris successfully petitioned the 
U.S. Supreme Court a third time on grounds “that the Oregon Supreme Court had defied 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s . . . direction[s] on the jury instruction issue.”  Id.  This time, 
however, the Supreme Court “issued a one-sentence per curiam decision that dismissed its 
writ of certiorari as ‘improvidently granted.’”  Id.  Although the case would seem to be 
over, a final issue is now being litigated as to whether Philip Morris is obligated to pay 
sixty percent of Mayola Williams’ punitive damages award to Oregon’s State Crime 
Victim’s Compensation Fund on the basis that Philip Morris’s participation in the 1998 
Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement fulfilled all of its obligations to state governments.  
Id.  To review the Master Settlement Agreement, see Master Settlement Agreement, CAL. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/msa.php (last 
visited April 22, 2010). 
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Now, the Oregon Supreme Court has been confronted with a new 
punitive damages controversy in the case of Patton v. Target.8  This 
new controversy requires the court to determine whether, pursuant to 
the language of Oregon’s split-recovery statute, the parties to a case 
must obtain the State’s consent before settling in a manner that would 
deprive the State of its sixty percent share of any punitive damages 
awarded to the plaintiff.9 
The controversy presented in Patton stems from one of the biggest 
punitive damages debates in recent decades,10 namely the dramatic 
increase in the size and number of such awards, particularly in 
products liability litigation.11  The concern underlying this 
controversy is that large punitive damage awards “are generally seen 
as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to receive full 
compensation for their injuries––but no more.”12  Some sources have 
argued that the possible consequences of such windfalls are far-
reaching.13  For instance, large awards of punitive damages have been 
criticized for “putting plaintiffs in a superior bargaining position in 
negotiations and for increasing the cost of insurance.”14 
As a result of the “windfall” controversy, punitive damages have 
often been the target of tort reform15 by businesses and insurance 
companies who have carried their messages of reform to the courts 
and legislatures.16  Courts and legislatures have responded by 
adopting laws that have limited the availability of punitive damages in 
a variety of ways.17  For instance, many states, including Oregon, 
require plaintiffs to meet stringent burdens of proof such as 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff has the 
 
8 Patton v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 942, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). 
9 Under ORS 31.735, sixty percent of a punitive damages award must be paid to the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account of the Department of Justice Crime Victims’ 
Assistance Section. 
10 See DOBBS, supra note 1, § 3.11(1). 
11 David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 
39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 371 (1994). 
12 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983). 
13 Junping Han, The Constitutionality of Oregon’s Split-Recovery Punitive Damages 
Statute, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 477, 490 (2002). 
14 Id. at 493. 
15 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive 
Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 34 (1990). 
16 Owen, supra note 11, at 371. 
17 Id. 
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right to recover punitive damages.18  Other states either have placed 
caps on the amount of recoverable punitive damages or passed 
“legislation authorizing the bifurcation of punitive damages cases 
separating the liability/compensatory damages aspects of the case 
from the punitive damages aspect.”19 
Dissatisfied with the solutions described above, Oregon became 
one of the first states to respond to the windfall controversy by 
implementing a split-recovery statute.20  Under Oregon’s statute, 
upon entry of a verdict including an award of punitive damages, the 
State becomes a judgment creditor as to the punitive damages portion 
of the award.21  While forty percent of the punitive damages amount 
of the award goes to the prevailing party, with no more than twenty 
percent of that going to the prevailing party’s attorney, sixty percent 
is paid to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account of the 
Department of Justice Crime Victims’ Assistance Section.22 
Although Oregon’s split-recovery statute was intended to remedy 
the windfall controversy and still provide for attorneys’ fees, it 
created the new controversy now confronting the Oregon Supreme 
Court in Patton v. Target.  In that case, after the verdict but before the 
district court entered a final judgment, the parties settled and jointly 
moved for a judgment dismissing the case, effectively cutting the 
State out of its portion of the punitive damages award.23  Although 
the State moved to intervene, arguing that the parties could not settle 
without the State’s consent, the district court denied the State’s 
claim.24  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified to the Oregon 
Supreme Court the question of whether the parties to a case must first 
obtain the State’s consent before settling the case in a manner that 
deprives the State of its sixty percent share of those punitive 
damages.25 
The question to be answered by the Oregon Supreme Court has 
important consequences for the State as well as for plaintiffs and 
defendants.  For Oregon, the split-recovery statute serves as an 
 
18 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN § 09.17.020 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221(5) (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(1) (2009). 
19 Galligan, supra note 15, at 35. 
20 Han, supra note 13, at 494–95. 
21 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(5). 
22 Id. § 31.735(1)(a)–(b). 
23 Patton v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 942, 943 (9th Cir. 2009). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 948–49. 
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important source of State revenue.  The State therefore has a 
significant interest in protecting that revenue.  Plaintiffs and 
defendants also have a significant interest in the outcome of this issue 
because the parties to litigation in split-recovery states often have 
incentive to settle after verdicts that include punitive damages 
awards.26  Under Oregon’s split-recovery statute, for instance, 
plaintiffs who settle may be able to “recoup personally what 
otherwise would be allocated to the state.”27  Because plaintiffs in 
Oregon can expect to recover only forty percent of a punitive 
damages award,28 to the plaintiff, “any settlement above the expected 
forty percent recovery after the litigation [and attorney] costs would 
be favored.”29  Moreover, because punitive damages are includable in 
a plaintiff’s taxable income,30 plaintiffs can obtain a greater recovery 
amount and avoid paying taxes on that amount by entering into 
settlements that exclude punitive damages.  Additionally, “any 
settlement less than the amount of the estimated punitive award would 
be acceptable to the defendant.”31 
This Note discusses the resolution of the issue currently certified to 
the Oregon Supreme Court in three Parts.  Part I reviews the evolution 
of Oregon’s split-recovery statute as well as the significant issues that 
have preceded and inform the current controversy presented in 
Patton.  Part II then explains the current controversy involved in 
Patton as well as the parties’ arguments regarding its resolution.  
Finally, Part III offers a resolution to the question pending before the 
Oregon Supreme Court. 
Ultimately, the “key to answering the . . . question” certified to the 
Oregon Supreme Court lies in distinguishing “between a claim for 
punitive damages . . . and an award of punitive damages.”32  Such a 
distinction indicates that parties to litigation may settle their dispute 
prior to a final judgment without the State’s consent for several 
reasons.  First, the most the Oregon Legislature had the power to 
grant the State of Oregon after a verdict for punitive damages was an 
expectancy interest in a future punitive damages judgment.  Second, 
 
26 Han, supra note 13, at 499. 
27 Id. at 500. 
28 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1)(a) (2009). 
29 Han, supra note 13, at 500. 
30 O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 85 (1996). 
31 Han, supra note 13, at 500. 
32 Brief of Amicus Curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass’n at 1, Patton v. Target Corp, 580 
F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-35177). 
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ORS 31.735 does not grant the State of Oregon any right to control a 
plaintiff’s underlying claim.  Third, the Oregon Legislature has 
enacted ample safeguards to protect the State of Oregon’s interest in 
punitive damages awards. 
I 
OREGON’S SPLIT-RECOVERY STATUTE: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR 
OREGON’S CURRENT PUNITIVE DAMAGES CONTROVERSY 
“Under Oregon’s punitive damages scheme, the function of 
punitive damages is to ‘punish a willful, wanton, or malicious 
wrongdoer and to deter that wrongdoer and others similarly situated 
from like conduct in the future.’”33  As such, punitive damages may 
be awarded if a defendant has acted with “wanton disregard”34 for the 
health and safety of others as long as such conduct is proven by “clear 
and convincing evidence.”35  Moreover, in Oregon, punitive damages 
are not awarded to compensate for expenses, inconvenience, or other 
injuries suffered, but they are allowed in addition to compensatory 
damages, which compensate plaintiffs for their losses,36 in part, to 
provide for a plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.37 
Additionally, Oregon juries have great discretion in determining 
the amount of punitive damages awards and, in doing so,  
consider the likelihood of serious harm, the defendant’s awareness 
of the likelihood that the misconduct will cause such harm, the 
profitability of the misconduct, the duration and concealment of the 
misconduct, the attitude and conduct of the defendant upon 
discovery of the misconduct, the deterrent effect of other 
punishments, and the defendant’s financial condition.38   
Although Oregon juries are “not required to consider the actual 
amount of compensatory damages” when “determining the amount of 
punitive awards,” the amount of such awards “must be reasonably 
related to the compensatory damages.”39  There must also exist “some 
 
33 Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 310 Or. 206, 210, 797 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1990). 
34 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1993) (amended 1995). 
35 Id. 
36 Honeywell, 310 Or. at 210, 797 P.2d at 1021. 
37 See REGINALD C. NETTLES, 1 DAMAGES § 3.2 (Oregon CLE 1998). 
38 Han, supra note 13, at 489 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
39 Id.  In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
punitive damages must be reasonable based on the degree of reprehensibility of the 
conduct, the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and any criminal or civil 
penalties applicable to the conduct.  BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
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rational nexus” between an award of punitive damages and the 
evidence of damages in the record, although the Oregon Supreme 
Court has not defined a “specific, mathematically precise outer limit 
on punitive damages.”40 
A.  The Evolution of Oregon’s Split-Recovery Statute 
Unsatisfied with other methods of statutory reform, the Oregon 
Legislature enacted a tort reform package in 1987 in response to a 
financial crisis in the liability insurance industry, which resulted in 
Oregon’s first split-recovery statute.41  ORS 18.540 provided that 
after a prevailing party’s attorney was paid, the plaintiffs and the State 
were to share equally in the remaining punitive damages award.42 
In 1990, however, the weakness of Oregon’s first split-recovery 
statute was revealed in Eulrich v. Snap-On Tools Corp., in which the 
court determined that the State had no interest in an award of punitive 
damages until a fund capable of distribution existed.43  The Oregon 
Legislature responded in 1991 by providing that, upon the entry of a 
judgment for punitive damages, the Department of Justice would 
become a judgment creditor as to the punitive damages portion of the 
award to which the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account would 
be entitled.44  The amended statute also recalculated the time frame 
for when the State’s interest in the punitive damage award accrued.45  
Under the amended statute, the Department of Justice became a 
judgment creditor as to the portion of the punitive award allocated to 
the Victims’ Compensation Fund “upon entry of a judgment.”46 
However, even the new version of Oregon’s split-recovery statute 
was deemed by the Oregon Legislature to insufficiently protect the 
State’s interest.47  Thus, Oregon’s split-recovery statute was again 
amended in 1995 when the State’s share of punitive damages was 
increased to sixty percent and plaintiff’s attorneys were to be paid up 
 
40 Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 320 Or. 544, 551, 556 n.12, 888 P.2d 8, 11, 14 n.12 
(1995). 
41 See Kathy T. Graham, 1987 Oregon Tort Reform Legislation: True Reform or Mere 
Restatement?, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 283, 301 (1988). 
42 1987 Or. Laws ch. 774 § 3 (current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735). 
43 Eulrich v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 103 Or. App. 610, 613, 798 P.2d 715, 716 (1990). 
44 1991 Or. Laws. ch. 862 § 1. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Patton v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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to twenty percent out of the plaintiff’s forty percent share.48  
Additionally, the statute was amended such that the Department of 
Justice became a judgment creditor “upon the entry of a verdict,” 
rather than upon entry of a judgment in the hope of preventing clever 
litigants from settling their claims and depriving the State of its share 
of punitive damages awards.49 
Oregon’s split-recovery statute provided a solution to the windfall 
problem and preserved the purposes of punitive damages such as 
deterrence and punishment.50  The standard for the imposition of 
punitive damages, for instance, remains the same,51 and Oregon 
courts still instruct juries to award punitive damages for the purpose 
of punishment and deterrence.52  Oregon courts also prohibit the split-
recovery statute from affecting punitive damages awards by 
prohibiting jury instructions from including information about the 
allocation of the award.53  Thus, split-recovery statutes maintain 
balance between the windfall problem and the goals of punishment 
and compensation. 
The effectiveness of the split-recovery system can be further 
understood by comparing it to the methods of reform adopted by 
other states.  Because capping systems place limits on punitive 
damage awards without consideration of defendants’ financial 
situations, they may not adequately punish wealthy defendants.54  
Thus, although a capping system may reduce windfalls, it may also 
 
48 1995 Or. Laws. ch. 688 § 1(1)(a); Patton, 580 F.3d at 944. 
49 1995 Or. Laws ch. 688 § 1(1).  Although the latest amendment to Oregon’s split-
recovery statute was made in 1997, no significant changes were made to the previous 
version.  1997 Or. Laws ch. 73 § 1. 
50 Lynda A. Sloane, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True 
Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 473, 484–85 (1993). 
51 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730 (2009). 
52 Honeywell v. Sterling Furniture Co., 310 Or. 206, 210–11, 797 P.2d 1019, 1021 
(1990) (noting, “[t]here is nothing that we have found . . . indicating the legislature 
intended [ORS 18.540] to change the purposes behind the punitive damages award” of 
punishment and deterrence “when it enacted a new mandate for distribution of the 
proceeds of such awards”). 
53 Id. at 211, 797 P.2d at 1022 (holding it reversible error to permit “a jury to consider 
as a part of its deliberations on punitive damages that a plaintiff should receive a certain 
amount of money and, in order to ensure that he does, to add additional amounts to pay for 
attorney fees and contributions to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
54 Nicholas M. Miller, Note, ‘Tis Better to Give Than to Receive: Charitable Donations 
of Medical Malpractice Punitive Damages, 12 J.L. & HEALTH 141, 157–62 (1997–98) 
(discussing statutory caps and the split-recovery scheme). 
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fail to achieve the purpose of punishment and deterrence.55  Split-
recovery schemes, on the other hand, allow juries to assess each 
defendant’s particular financial situation, ensure adequate punishment 
and deterrence, and address the windfall problem by allocating a 
portion of a plaintiff’s award to the State.56 
B.  Oregon’s Split-Recovery Statute Controversies: The Predecessors 
of Patton v. Target 
Despite the benefits of Oregon’s split-recovery statute, it has 
resulted in litigation involving various aspects of the State’s rights to 
a portion of punitive damages awards.  The issues that emerge in 
these cases are instrumental to understand the current punitive 
damages controversy presented in the case of Patton v. Target. 
In 2002, the Oregon Supreme Court stated in DeMendoza v. 
Huffman that a vested property right in a punitive damages award 
cannot accrue before the entry of a final judgment because such 
awards represent, at most, an expectation interest.57  In that case, the 
Supreme Court stated that Oregon’s split-recovery statute 
unambiguously created “in the state a substantive right as a judgment 
creditor to 60 percent of any punitive damages award.”58 
Then, in the 2008 case of MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. Daimler 
Chrysler AG, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that Oregon’s split-
recovery statute gives the State standing to intervene in a lawsuit.59  
Specifically, the State obtains a vested right to sixty percent of a 
jury’s award of punitive damages upon the entry of a verdict for 
punitive damages.60  Moreover, it is not necessary for the State to 
become a party to the case because the State’s status as a judgment 
creditor gives it the ability to enforce a judgment for punitive 
damages.61 
 
55 Han, supra note 13, at 496. 
56 Id. at 497. 
57 DeMendoza v. Huffman, 334 Or. 425, 449, 51 P.3d 1232, 1245–46 (2002).  In this 
case, the Oregon Supreme Court also held that Oregon’s split-recovery “statute [did] not 
violate Article I, sections 10, 17, or 18; Article III, section 1; Article IV, section 18; 
Article VII (Amended), sections 1 or 3; or Article IX, sections 1 or 3, of the Oregon 
Constitution.”  Id. at 455, 51 P.3d at 1249. 
58 Id. at 432, 51 P.3d at 1236. 
59 MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. Daimler Chrysler AG, 218 Or. App. 117, 127, 179 P.3d 
675, 680 (2008). 
60 Id. at 130, 179 P.3d at 681. 
61 Id. 
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II 
THE CONTROVERSY CONTINUES: PATTON V. TARGET 
The current controversy surrounding the State’s rights to its portion 
of a punitive damages award under Oregon’s split-recovery statute, 
ORS 31.735, centers on whether the State’s consent is required before 
a court may enter a judgment giving effect to any settlement between 
the parties that would reduce or eliminate the State’s portion of the 
punitive damages award. 
A.  The Facts of Patton v. Target 
In Patton v. Target, James Patton sued Target Corporation “in 
federal district court for asserted violations of the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) and for 
wrongful discharge under Oregon law.”62  A “jury found in Target’s 
favor on the USERRA claim, but found in Patton’s favor on the state 
law claim.”63  As such, the jury “awarded [the plaintiff] $17,950 in 
economic damages, $67,000 in noneconomic damages, and $900,000 
in punitive damages.”64 
“Shortly after the verdict, . . . Patton and Target reached a 
settlement and jointly moved the court to approve a stipulated 
judgment dismissing the case.”65  “Neither the motion nor the 
stipulated judgment disclosed” the amount of the settlement “nor was 
[a] provision for . . . payment to the State included in the 
settlement.”66 
Subsequently, the State moved to intervene, arguing that the parties 
could not settle without its consent because, as determined in 
Aktiengesellschaft, the State “had obtained a vested interest in 60 
percent of the punitive damages award upon the entry of the verdict” 
and was, therefore, a judgment creditor.67  Although the district court 
allowed the State to intervene, it “approved the proposed settlement 
and denied the State’s claim, . . . reason[ing] that the State could not 
have obtained a vested interest in the punitive damages award prior to 
the entry of a judgment and that the parties were therefore free to 
 
62 Patton v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 942, 943 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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settle without the State’s . . . consent.”68  The State then “filed a 
motion for relief from the district court’s judgment.”69 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined ORS 31.735 in order to 
answer the question of exactly when the State becomes a judgment 
creditor and is therefore entitled to participate in settlement 
agreements between the parties to litigation.70  In doing so, the court 
noted that, because the 1991 version of Oregon’s split-recovery 
statute provided that the State did not become a judgment creditor 
until the entry of a judgment for punitive damages, a loophole was 
created whereby the parties could, pursuant to confidential settlement, 
“stipulate to the entry of a judgment dismissing the case without an 
award of punitive damages.”71  “Because no ‘judgment’ . . . would be 
entered, the State would not become a judgment creditor . . . and 
would have no claim on any proceeds from the suit.”72  Thus, the 
court recognized that the purpose of the 1995 amendment, which 
made the State a judgment creditor “upon the entry of a verdict 
including an award of punitive damages,” was to prevent the 
foreclosure of the State’s ability to recover punitive damages.73 
However, the court went on to explain that, while the intent of the 
Legislature in amending the statute was to prevent litigants from 
using post-verdict settlements to deprive the State of its share of 
punitive damages, the text of the statute does not necessarily embody 
that intent.74  According to the Ninth Circuit, there were several 
provisions of the statute that contradict the Legislature’s intent.75  For 
instance, the court found that the lack of a definition of the phrase 
“judgment creditor” in ORS 31.735, the appearance of the phrase in 
several other provisions of the statute in which “the concept of a 
‘judgment creditor’ appears inseparable from the existence of a 
judgment,” and “the generally accepted definition of a ‘judgment 
creditor’” as a “‘person having a legal right to enforce execution of a 
judgment for a specific sum of money,’” leads to the reasonable 
 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 944. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 945 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735(1) (1995)). 
74 Id. 
75 See id. at 945 (discussing the use of the term “judgment creditor” throughout the 
statute). 
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conclusion that the State cannot be a judgment creditor prior to the 
entry of a judgment.76 
The Ninth Circuit therefore determined that the proper 
interpretation of the statute would require a court to “find some 
meaning in the legislature’s paradoxical decision to make the State a 
judgment creditor without a judgment.”77  Realizing that this case 
turned on an open question of law and that a decision by the Ninth 
Circuit would not therefore be authoritative, the Ninth Circuit 
certified the issue to the Oregon Supreme Court.  The Oregon 
Supreme Court granted the petition for review in October 2009.78 
B.  Resolving the Controversy Under Oregon’s Methods of Statutory 
Construction 
The parties in Patton v. Target argued that the Oregon Supreme 
Court’s resolution of this important issue should center on Oregon’s 
methods of statutory construction as outlined in Portland General 
Electric Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries (PGE v. BOLI).  Under 
Oregon’s approach to statutory construction, the court’s task in 
interpreting a statute is to discern the intent of the Legislature.79  To 
do this, the court first examines both the text and context of the 
statute.80  At this level of analysis, the text of the statute is the starting 
point for interpretation and is the best evidence of the Legislature’s 
intent.81  In trying to determine the meaning of a statutory provision, 
the court considers rules of construction of the statutory text that bear 
directly on how to read the text,82 such as not inserting what has been 
omitted and not omitting what has been inserted,83 as well as giving 
common words their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.84  At this 
level, the court also considers the context of the statutory provision at 
issue.  This includes considering provisions of the same and related 
 
76 Id. at 945 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 921 (9th ed. 2009)). 
77 Id. at 946 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (2009)). 
78 Patton v. Target Corp., 347 Or. 260, 260 (2009) (Table, NO. S057752). 
79 Portland Gen. Elec. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus. (PGE v. BOLI), 317 Or. 606, 610, 
859 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1993), superseded by statute, OR. REV. STAT. 174.020, as 
recognized in State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 171–72, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050–51 (2009). 
80 Id. at 610; 859 P.2d at 1146. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 611; 859 P.2d at 1146. 
83 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (2009). 
84 State v. Langley, 314 Or. 247, 256, 839 P.2d 692, 698 (1992), adhered to on 
reconsideration, 318 Or. 28, 861 P.2d 1012 (1993). 
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statute as well as using rules of construction that bear directly on the 
interpretation of the statutory provision in context, such as the rule 
that a particular intent shall control a general one that is 
inconsistent.85 
If the intent of the Legislature is not clear from the text and context 
of the statute, the court will then consider legislative history to inform 
its analysis of legislative intent to determine whether, taken together, 
the legislative history, the text, and the content make the legislative 
intent clear.86  If the legislative intent is clear, then the court’s inquiry 
into legislative intent and the meaning of the statute is complete, and 
the court interprets the statute to have the meaning thus determined.87 
However, if the Legislature’s intent remains unclear, then the court 
may resort to general maxims of statutory construction to aid in 
resolving any uncertainty.88  One such maxim requires that, where no 
legislative history exists, the court must attempt to determine how the 
Legislature would have intended the statute to be applied had it 
considered the issue.89 
1.  The State as a Judgment Creditor: The State’s Statutory 
Construction Argument 
The State argued that, under Oregon’s methods of statutory 
construction, as outlined in PGE v. BOLI, the plain meaning and 
context of the statutory text, as well as the legislative history of ORS 
31.735, indicate that the State becomes a judgment creditor upon the 
entry of a verdict for punitive damages, thereby requiring the parties 
to obtain the State’s consent before settling a case in a manner that 
deprives the State of its sixty percent share of those punitive 
damages.90 
The State first argued that, under PGE v. BOLI, the statutory text 
and context of ORS 31.735 indicate that the State becomes a 
judgment creditor upon the entry of a verdict that includes punitive 
damages.  ORS 31.735 states that: 
 
85 PGE v. BOLI, 317 Or. at 612, 859 P.2d at 1146; OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020 (2009). 
86 PGE v. BOLI, 317 Or. at 611–12, 859 P.2d at 1146. 
87 Id. at 612, 859 P.2d at 1146. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 612, 859 P.2d at 1147. 
90 Appellant’s Brief at 11–12, Patton v. Target, 627 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-
35177), 2008 WL 4974001. 
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 (1) Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of punitive 
damages, the Department of Justice shall become a judgment 
creditor as to the punitive damages portion of the award to which 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account is entitled pursuant to 
paragraph (b) of this subjection, and the punitive damage portion of 
an award shall be allocated as follows: 
(a) Forty percent shall be paid to the prevailing party . . . . 
(b) Sixty percent shall be paid to the Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Account of the Department of Justice Crime 
Victims’ Assistance Section . . . . 
 . . . . 
 (4) Whenever a judgment includes both compensatory and 
punitive damages, any payment on the judgment by or on behalf of 
any defendant, whether voluntary or by execution or otherwise, 
shall be applied first to compensatory damages, costs and court-
awarded attorney fees awarded against that defendant and then to 
punitive damages awarded against that defendant unless all affected 
parties, including the Department of Justice, expressly agree 
otherwise . . . . 
 (5) Whenever any judgment creditor of a judgment which 
includes punitive damages governed by this section receives any 
payment on the judgment by or on behalf of any defendant, the 
judgment creditor receiving the payment shall notify the attorney 
for the other judgment creditors and all sums collected shall be 
applied as required by subsections (1) and (4) of this section, unless 
all affected parties, including the Department of Justice, expressly 
agree otherwise . . . .91 
According to the State, the plain meaning of this statutory text is not 
ambiguous and indicates that the State becomes a judgment creditor 
upon the entry of a verdict for punitive damages for several reasons.92 
First, the statute declares that, “[u]pon the entry of a verdict 
including an award of punitive damages, [the State] shall become a 
judgment creditor.”93  The simplest, plain meaning interpretation of 
the phrase “entry” is that it is the “entry of a verdict” that triggers the 
State’s status as a judgment creditor.94  Moreover, nothing else in the 
statute suggests that the State’s judgment creditor status is contingent 
upon any additional events.95 
Second, the simplest plain meaning interpretation of the phrase 
“shall” is “that recognition of the state’s judgment creditor status is 
 
91 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (2009) (emphasis added). 
92 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 90, at 11. 
93 OR. REV. STAT. § 31.735 (1997). 
94 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 90, at 15–20. 
95 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 1499 (indicating that the drafters’ 
general understanding of the word ‘shall’ is that one is “required to”). 
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mandatory”.96  Thus, use of the word “shall” in the statute indicates 
that the State must be accorded judgment creditor status upon the 
entry of a verdict.97 
Third, when the statutory language is considered within the context 
of other provisions of the same and related statutes, the rule “that a 
particular intent controls a general intent that is inconsistent with the 
particular intent” also indicates that the plain, ordinary language of 
the statute confers judgment creditor status upon the entry of a 
verdict.98  Thus, although other provisions in Chapter 18 state that 
judgment creditor status is created by the entry of a judgment, ORS 
31.735 is the more particular provision with respect to the specific 
circumstances at issue and should therefore apply to the statutory 
provision at issue.99  Moreover, while the phrase “judgment creditor” 
is used throughout Chapter 18, it is never expressly defined, nor does 
anything in Chapter 18 purport to apply such a definition to ORS 
31.735.100 
Finally, subsections (4) and (5) of the statute, “when read in 
combination with subsection (1) . . . suggest that entry of a punitive 
damages verdict [also] renders the state a ‘party.’”101  As such, parties 
to litigation “are not free to eliminate a punitive damages award 
without the state’s involvement.”102 
For all of these reasons, the State argued that the plain language of 
ORS 31.735 indicates that the State becomes a judgment creditor 
upon the entry of a verdict for punitive damages.103 
However, if the Supreme Court of Oregon determines that the 
statutory language remains ambiguous, it may then look to the 
legislative history of the statute.  The State therefore asserts that an 
examination of the legislative history in this case also indicates that 
ORS 31.735 confers judgment creditor status on the State upon the 
entry of a verdict for several reasons.104  First, the Legislature’s 1991 
amendment of Oregon’s split-recovery statute clearly indicates that 
 
96 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 90, at 16. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 18–19 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020 (2009)). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 19. 
101 Id. at 20. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 15–20. 
104 Id. at 21–22. 
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the Legislature intended to confer judgment creditor status on the 
State upon entry of a verdict for punitive damages.105  The 1991 
amendment was promulgated by the case of Eulrich v. Snap-On Tools 
Corp., in which the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the State had 
no interest in an award of punitive damages until a fund capable of 
distribution existed, thus suggesting that “no state right was created 
by entry of either a verdict or a judgment granting punitive 
damages.”106 
The 1991 Legislature amended its split-recovery statute in response 
to Eulrich.107   
As the Oregon Court of Appeals has observed, Oregon Attorney 
General Frohnmayer testified as follows to the House Committee on 
the Judiciary: 
“Mr. Chairman, the case to which you may be referring is [Eulrich], 
a case decided in 1990 by the Court of Appeals . . . that effectively 
precludes us from intervening in a potential punitive damages case 
which is why we submit to the committee proposed legislation so 
that it would be clear that the state has an interest in a legitimate 
punitive damages award at the time that it is given.”108 
The legislature responded to the state’s request by amending then 
“[ORS] 18.540 to provide that entry of a judgment awarding punitive 
damages renders the Department of Justice a judgment creditor.”109 
Second, the Legislature again amended the split-recovery statute in 
1995, in response to concerns that the 1991 amendment still left a 
loophole whereby clever litigants could settle their claims and deprive 
the State of its share of the punitive damages award.110  When 
considering the amendment, one legislator said, 
I heard Attorney General Kulongoski describe that in some 
situations after a verdict is reached that maybe the parties go back 
and rework the settlement . . . .  The state’s interest in these awards 
sometimes is defeated by some maneuvering that seems to enrich 
and maybe even more than—windfall might be kind of a gentle 
 
105 Id. at 22. 
106 Id. at 23–24. 
107 Id. at 25. 
108 Id. at 25 (quoting MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 218 Or. App. 
117, 126 n.4, 179 P.3d 675, 679 n.4 (2008) (quoting Tape Recording, House Committee 
on Judiciary, HB 3524, Mar. 27, 1991)). 
109 Id. 
110 Patton v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 942, 944 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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phrase to describe the activity but it seems like maybe the plaintiff 
and their lawyer come out a lot better than perhaps they should.111 
A representative of the bill’s sponsor made a similar statement: 
The Attorney General’s right does not vest until after the judgment 
is entered.  And so if the parties are smart and if there is a large 
punitive damages award entered, the parties will sit down and 
construct a . . . settlement which will provide that no final judgment 
will be awarded or that they will stipulate to a final judgment that 
will provide an award of general damages of a certain amount.  And 
parties do that quite often, by the way, because they like to avoid 
the expense of appeal potentially.  But they can under the present 
statute in essence cut out the Attorney General from that portion of 
the award because again, the Attorney General does not have the 
right to intervene until the judgment is entered.112 
The Legislature subsequently amended the statute to declare that the 
Department of Justice became a judgment creditor upon “entry of a 
verdict,” rather than upon entry of a judgment.113  Thus, the State 
argues, it is clear that “[t]he 1995 Legislative Assembly intended to 
prevent plaintiffs . . . from doing precisely what was done in” Patton 
v. Target.114 
For all of these reasons, the State asserts that the legislative history 
of ORS 31.735 clearly indicates that the State becomes a judgment 
creditor upon the entry of a verdict for punitive damages.115 
2.  The Requirement of a Judgment: Target Corporation’s Statutory 
Construction Argument 
In contrast, the defendant-appellee, Target Corporation, argues that 
under the methods of statutory construction described in PGE v. 
BOLI, the Oregon Supreme Court need not examine the legislative 
history of ORS 31.735 because its statutory text and context are not 
ambiguous and clearly indicate that parties to litigation may settle 
their disputes without the State’s permission for several reasons.116 
 
111 Id. at 117, 179 P.3d at 680 (quoting Tape Recording, S. Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Civil Process, S.B. 482, Tape 28, Side A (Or. 1995) (statement of Randy Miller)). 
112 Id. at 117, 179 P.3d at 680–81 (quoting Tape Recording, S. Judiciary Subcommittee 
on Civil Process, S.B. 482, Tape 28, Side A (Or. 1995) (statement of John DiLorenzo)). 
113 Appellant’s Brief, supra note 90, at 28. 
114 Id. at 27. 
115 Id. at 23–29. 
116 Appellee’s Brief at 2, Patton v. Target Corp., 627 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 08-
35177), 2008 WL 6690720. 
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First, in examining the statutory text of ORS 31.735 as required by 
PGE v. BOLI, Target argues that the central terms at issue, 
“judgment,” “creditor,” and “judgment creditor,” each have a well-
defined legal definition that indicates a plain, unambiguous 
meaning.117  This plain, unambiguous meaning is that a judgment 
must be rendered before the State can possibly become a “judgment 
creditor.”118 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, for instance, a “judgment” is 
defined as “[a] court’s final determination of the rights and 
obligations of the parties in a case.”119  Moreover, a “creditor” is 
“[o]ne to whom a debt is owed . . . .  A person or entity with a definite 
claim against another, esp[ecially] a claim that is capable of 
adjustment and liquidation.”120  Lastly, a “judgment creditor” is “[a] 
person having a legal right to enforce execution of a judgment for a 
specific sum of money.”121  The phrase “specific sum of money” is 
significant because a verdict that includes punitive damages “is, at 
best, an expectancy” and cannot be considered a “specific sum” 
because there is no guarantee that a verdict will be upheld.122  Thus, 
while the language of ORS 31.735 provides that the State shall 
become a judgment creditor upon the entry of a verdict that includes 
an award of punitive damages, Target argues that the above 
definitions indicate that the State cannot be a “judgment creditor” 
unless a final judgment exists, giving the State a legal right to enforce 
execution of a judgment for a specific sum of money.123 
Second, “under ORS 174.010, a court may not ‘insert what has 
been omitted’ in a statute.”124  This is significant because ORS 
31.735 does not say anything about parties being “forbidden from 
settling their own dispute[s] without the State’s permission before 
entry of a judgment.”125  Thus, Target argues that a “[c]ourt cannot . . 
. insert a prohibition on litigants that the Oregon legislature did 
not.”126 
 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 4. 
119 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 918. 
120 Id. at 424. 
121 Id. at 921. 
122 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 116, at 4. 
123 Id. at 3–4. 
124 Id. at 5. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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Target also argues that, even if the Oregon Supreme Court does 
determine that the statutory text is ambiguous and that it must 
therefore examine the statute’s legislative history, the court could not 
arrive at the interpretation urged by the State because “a court [may 
only] give effect to legislative intent if possible.”127  Here, Target 
asserts that implementing the State’s interpretation of Oregon’s split-
recovery statute would be impossible because it would create 
“illogical and impractical” consequences.128 
For instance, Target argues that “the Oregon Supreme Court’s 
decision in DeMendoza v. Huffman . . . precludes [a] [c]ourt from 
interpreting ORS 31.735 to prevent the parties from settling their 
dispute without the State’s consent” because the court held in that 
case “that a party does not have a vested right in a punitive damages 
award before judgment is entered.”129  In addition, Black’s Law 
Dictionary defines “vested” as “having become a completed, 
consummated right for present or future enjoyment; not contingent; 
unconditional; absolute.”130  Punitive damages awards, however, are 
“‘necessarily contingent and discretionary.’”131  Target therefore 
concludes that the statute cannot possibly be interpreted as giving the 
State a vested right in a punitive damages verdict.132 
For all of these reasons, Target asserts that the State cannot claim 
the status of a judgment creditor and that parties to litigation may 
therefore settle prior to a judgment without the State’s consent.133 
III 
RESOLVING PATTON V. TARGET: SUGGESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Ultimately, as argued by the Oregon Trial Lawyers Association in 
an amicus curiae brief, “[t]he key to answering the certified question” 
to the Oregon Supreme Court lies in distinguishing “between a claim 
for punitive damages and an award of punitive damages.”134  Such a 
distinction indicates that parties to litigation may settle their dispute 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
130 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1595 (8th ed. 2004). 
131 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 116, at 11 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 
F.3d 985, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
132 Id. at 13. 
133 Id. 
134 Brief of Amicus Curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 32, at 1. 
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prior to a final judgment without the State’s consent for several 
reasons. 
First, the Oregon Legislature had the power to grant the State of 
Oregon only an expectancy interest in a future punitive damages 
judgment.135  Although the State relies heavily on its assertion that 
the Oregon Legislature intended “to grant the State an indefeasible 
interest in a share of a punitive damages verdict,” the Legislature’s 
“power only goes so far.”136  For instance, a verdict for punitive 
damages is “subject to extensive judicial review, alteration, and 
possibly elimination.”137  Thus, because “the amount of punitive 
damages that [will] ultimately be awarded [is] uncertain, the most 
that” the Legislature could confer upon the State “is an expectancy or 
contingen[cy] interest.”138  Moreover, the Legislature cannot give the 
State a greater interest in a punitive damages verdict than a plaintiff’s 
expectancy interest by giving the State a vested interest in a punitive 
damages verdict even though a plaintiff would retain a mere 
expectancy interest. 139  This is because “Constitutional principles of 
due process command that the entire award at the time of [a] verdict 
is a mere expectancy [that is] subject to reduction or elimination for 
excessiveness.”140  Thus, the Oregon Legislature had the power to 
grant the State only an expectancy interest in a punitive damages 
verdict and no more.141 
Second, the State of Oregon is not granted any right to control a 
plaintiff’s underlying claim under ORS 32.735.142  Under Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services, for example, “a fundamental maxim of 
the American judicial system [is] that ‘[p]laintiffs are masters of their 
complaints’ even after [a] verdict [or] judgment and through” the 
 
135 Id. at 3. 
136 Id. 
137 Id.  Under ORS 31.730(2), a “court review of a jury’s decision for rationality” is 
required.  Id.  Additionally, “principles of due process [provide for] post-verdict review 
and reduction of a[ punitive damages] award based on excessiveness.”  Id. (citing BMW of 
N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996)).  Moreover, “an entire case [can] be overturned on 
appeal.”  Id. 
138 Id. at 3. 
139 See id. at 4. 
140 Id. (citing BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 (holding that when a punitive damages “award can 
fairly be categorized as ‘grossly excessive’ in relation to [state] interests . . . it enter[s] the 
zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment”)). 
141 Id. at 5. 
142 Id. 
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appellate process.143  Moreover, “the only check on a plaintiff’s 
ability to waive or withdraw [a] claim[] [after a trial] is in the hands 
of a judge [rather than] the other parties.”144  Under Rule 54A of 
Oregon’s Rules of Civil Procedure, for instance, a plaintiff may 
dismiss her claim with the consent of a judge.145  Similarly, under 
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a]fter a defendant 
has answered, a plaintiff may [still] unilaterally dismiss [her claim] 
over a defendant’s objection.”146  Thus, because ORS 31.735 does not 
give the State any interest in the claim itself but only in the award, the 
consent of other parties is not required before a plaintiff can decide to 
dismiss her claim.147 
Furthermore, the fact that the Legislature would give the State a 
legally protected interest in the proceeds of a claim but not control 
over the underlying claim is not an anomaly.148  In wrongful death 
cases, for example, “the statutory beneficiaries of [the proceeds of a] 
claim are not parties and may not pursue the action on their own 
behalf.”149 
Third, the State of Oregon’s interest is amply protected through 
safeguards enacted by the Oregon Legislature.150  For instance, “the 
Legislature requires court oversight at every stage of the process” by 
requiring courts to “review the jury’s award under the ‘rational juror’ 
standard” and by requiring courts to approve the dismissal of a claim 
after a verdict has been handed down.151  Additionally, “ORS 
31.735(3) requires notice to the State . . . upon [the] entry of a verdict 
and upon [the] entry of a judgment.”152  Finally, the Court of Appeals 
in MAN Aktiengesellschaft has held that the State’s status as a 
judgment creditor, which gives it the ability to enforce a judgment for 
punitive damages, is sufficient protection.153 
 
143 Id. (citing Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 512 (1989)). 
144 Brief of Amicus Curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 32, at 5; see also 
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1); OR. R. CIV. P. 54 A. 
145 Brief of Amicus Curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Ass’n, supra note 32, at 6. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 7. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 7–8. 
152 Id. at 8. 
153 Id. (citing MAN Aktiengesellschaft v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 218 Or. App. 117, 179 
P.3d 675 (2008)). 
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In making the distinction between a claim for punitive damages 
and an award of punitive damages, it therefore becomes clear that, 
although the State may take steps to protect its interest in the ultimate 
award of punitive damages, it may not prevent a plaintiff from 
retaining control over her underlying claim. 
Although the above distinction indicates that the parties to 
litigation do not need to obtain the State’s consent before settling a 
claim, an examination of the implications of requiring them to do so 
also exemplifies the impracticability of such a requirement.  First, 
requiring the State’s consent before two parties may settle a claim 
might block worthy settlements that would otherwise end litigation 
and allow plaintiffs to obtain needed compensation without delay. 
Second, if parties must obtain the State’s consent prior to 
settlement, many attorneys may be reluctant to pursue claims for 
punitive damages at the risk of not being able to control the claim or 
minimize the potential risks of taxation, allocation, and appeal on 
behalf of their clients. 
Third, the inability to settle a claim without the State’s consent 
could render the recovery of punitive damages meaningless to 
plaintiffs and attorneys as a result of tax consequences.  If, for 
example, a plaintiff receives the remaining forty percent of a punitive 
damages claim and must give upwards of twenty percent to his 
attorney, a plaintiff could therefore be left with an amount that is far 
less than he could have obtained through settlement. 
Moreover, many plaintiffs might view such a requirement as 
unjust, considering the fact that the plaintiff must bring a claim and 
bear the risks and burdens of doing so, while the State bears no risk 
and offers nothing to a plaintiff’s case but could nonetheless block a 
proposed settlement and prevent the plaintiff from being 
compensated.  Although the State could possibly walk away with 
nothing when parties decide to settle after a verdict but prior to a 
judgment, fairness would seem to be more adequately served by 
allowing the State to walk away with nothing when it contributes 
nothing to the proceedings rather than allowing plaintiffs to bear the 
entire burden of litigation only to have control over their underlying 
claims stripped away. 
Finally, if the Supreme Court of Oregon were to determine that the 
State can intervene under ORS 31.735 to prevent parties to litigation 
from settling, it would also have to determine how the State would do 
so without violating the principles of due process, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and Oregon’s Rules of Civil Procedure.  If, on the 
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other hand, the Supreme Court were to determine that the split-
recovery statute does not allow such intervention by the State, the 
issue of protecting the State’s interest in punitive damages awards 
would seem to return to the Legislature, which would then need to 
determine how to provide the State with a vested interest in punitive 
damages verdicts.  However, given the principles of the American 
judicial system described above, it would seem that this is also not a 
practical solution.  In essence, the Legislature would be required to 
change long-held distinctions between claims for punitive damages 
and awards for punitive damages. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the last few decades, states have responded to the controversy 
of punitive damage windfalls by implementing numerous statutory 
schemes that include caps on punitive damages and stringent burdens 
of proof.  Oregon’s split-recovery scheme, while effectively curbing 
the problem of windfalls by allocating a portion to the State, has 
resulted in a new controversy.  The Supreme Court of Oregon’s 
resolution of this controversy will have far-reaching effects.  
However, the limits of the Oregon Legislature to grant the State 
control over a plaintiff’s claim, the ample protections already 
provided for the State’s interest in an ultimate award of punitive 
damages, and the impracticalities of changing long-held principles of 
the American judicial system all indicate that the parties to a case 
need not obtain the State’s approval prior to settling a case. 
ADDENDUM 
On November 12, 2010, the Oregon Supreme Court filed an 
opinion154 that answered the question certified to it by the Ninth 
Circuit.155  In its opinion, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that 
it [was] simply not possible . . . to conclude that ORS 31.735 as 
presently worded makes the state’s consent necessary before a court 
may enter a judgment giving effect to a settlement between the 
parties that would reduce or eliminate punitive damages to which 
the state otherwise would be entitled, even if that is what the 
legislature intended.156 
 
154 Patton v. Target Corp., 349 Or. 230, 242 P.3d 611 (2010). 
155 See Patton v. Target Corp., 580 F.3d 942, 948–49 (9th Cir. 2009) (certifying 
question). 
156 Patton, 349 Or. at 243–44, 242 P.3d at 619. 
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The court began its analysis by examining the text of the statute.157  
First, the court determined that, at the time the Oregon Legislature 
amended Oregon’s split-recovery statute in 1991 to confer the status 
of judgment creditor upon the State, “the phrase ‘judgment creditor’ 
was not defined in the 1991 statute, nor is it [defined] today.”158  
Moreover, there is no indication that the legislature in 1991 intended 
that phrase to carry any other than “its common and usual meaning—
that is as a term intrinsically dependent on the existence of a 
judgment.”159  At the time of the 1991 amendment, Black’s Law 
Dictionary defined a judgment creditor as “[a] person in whose favor 
a money judgment is entered or a person who becomes entitled to 
enforce it.”160  That definition is “consistent with the . . . 
understanding of the phrase . . . today.”161 
Furthermore, when the Legislature amended the split-recovery 
statute in 1995 to provide that the Department of Justice shall become 
a judgment creditor upon the entry of a verdict including an award of 
punitive damages, the Legislature again did nothing to signal its 
intention to alter the common understanding of any term used in the 
statute.162  Second, the court noted that nothing in the statutory 
language of “ORS 31.735(1)––where the ‘judgment creditor’ status at 
issue in this case is created—speaks to, much less expressly requires 
the state’s consent to, a settlement.”163 
Next, the court focused on the legislative history of the statute.164  
In its analysis, the court explained that the legislative history 
surrounding the 1995 revision of the statute does indeed seem to 
speak directly to the Legislature’s intent to remedy the problem of 
parties eliminating the State’s potential interest in a punitive damages 
award by settling prior to a judgment.165  However, the court 
concluded “that there is an unbridged gap between what the 
legislature is said to have intended and what the words that the 
 
157 Id. at 233, 242 P.3d at 613. 
158 Id. at 236, 242 P.3d at 615. 
159 Id., 242 P.3d at 615. 
160 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 844–45 (6th ed. 1990). 
161 Patton, 349 Or. at 237, 242 P.3d at 615 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 76, at 921 (A “judgment creditor” is “a person having a legal right to enforce 
execution of a judgment for a specific sum of money.”)). 
162 Id. at 237–38, 242 P.3d at 616. 
163 Id. at 240, 242 P.3d at 617. 
164 Id. at 241, 242 P.3d at 618. 
165 Id at 243, 242 P.3d at 619. 
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legislature chose to use actually do.”166  In other words, the 
Legislature “failed to ‘translate [its] intent into operational language’” 
that would have achieved its goal of “allowing the [S]tate to block 
parties from settling without its consent.”167  Moreover, the court 
cannot “‘give effect to any supposed intention or meaning in the 
legislature, unless the words to be imported into the statute are, in 
substance at least, contained in it.’”168 
The effect of the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision is clear; at 
present, the State’s consent is not necessary before a court may enter 
a judgment giving effect to a settlement between the parties that 
would reduce or eliminate the sixty percent share of a punitive 
damages award to which the State would otherwise be entitled.  
However, the punitive damages controversy presented in Patton v. 
Target is not necessarily concluded.  The Oregon Supreme Court 
focused its resolution of the case on the statutory analysis of ORS 
31.735 and stated that “it is not possible . . . to conclude that ORS 
31.735 as presently worded makes the state’s consent necessary”169 
before parties to a case can settle.  When considered together, the 
court’s resolution of the case and the wording of its opinion seem to 
suggest that future analyses of Oregon’s split-recovery statute might 
be more favorable to the State should the Legislature succeed in 
translating its intent into operational language. 
Successful translation of the Legislature’s intent into operational 
language, however, would not remedy other impediments to the 
State’s ability to block parties from settling prior to a final judgment.  
As discussed above, these impediments include the limits of the 
Oregon Legislature to grant the State control over a plaintiff’s claim, 
the ample protections already provided for the State’s interest, and the 
impracticalities of changing long-held principles of the American 
judicial system.  Thus, it seems safe to say that, in Oregon, the 
punitive damages controversy will continue. 
 
 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. (quoting Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or. 475, 480, 632 P.2d 782, 785 (1981)). 
169 Id. (emphasis added). 
